Security

How your systems are protected, limits included.

Symbiont describes your clients' systems and keeps access in order, but it does not store passwords or keys: these are held in the vault, the encrypted store of keys. This page explains where each piece of data is kept, who can do what, and what remains your responsibility. It is intended for those who run a software house and for those who, on the client's side, need to assess whether the service can be trusted.

1 · Where keys are kept

Keys are held in the vault. The platform knows only their location.

  • In the vault, encrypted. The passwords, tokens and keys of your systems are held in a Bitwarden-compatible vault: the one we operate, or one owned by the software house. Contents are encrypted on each person's device, with keys derived from their master password: we do not know it and cannot read them.
  • On the platform, only references. The platform records a key's name, the vault collection that holds it, the environment it belongs to and who received it. Never the value.
  • Directly from the developer's computer. A new key travels from the computer to the vault the moment it is created, with nothing in between. This is done by dbc, Symbiont's program for the terminal, which the app installs on the computer and which the coding assistant uses to describe systems and handle keys.
  • An additional check. A description that appears to contain a secret is refused. This is a filter against mistakes, not a guarantee: the fundamental rule is that values are never written into the description.
2 · The AI never sees secrets

The coding assistant works with references, not with values.

  • A reference instead of the value. Where a key would appear, the coding assistant sees [secret:NAME]. When a command needs the key, dbc retrieves it from the vault and passes it directly to that command: the assistant never receives it.
  • A guard on the computer. It prevents the assistant from opening .env and other files with keys, printing environment variables, or querying the vault or the keychain.
  • The app does not see values either. The Keys tab shows only names and states: present, missing, held elsewhere.

It should be noted that the guard is a barrier against mistakes, not a guarantee. A program running under your user account can find another way. For this reason, values are read only inside dbc, never in files that the assistant can open.

3 · Roles and permissions

Each party sees only its own data. The rules are enforced by the database, not by the interface.

Each software house sees only its own data: the rules are defined in the database, row by row, and are verified by automated tests. For people working in the software house, they apply only after authentication with the second factor.

second factor required

Owner

Sees
Every system of the software house, the team, the logs.
Can
Invite and remove people, grant and revoke keys, authorize production keys, block or release emergency keys.
second factor required

Member

Sees
Description and map of every system.
Can
Work on the systems. Receives only the keys an owner grants; production keys only for the systems where an owner authorizes them.
second factor recommended

Client

Sees
On the web, all the documentation of their own systems, read-only, and the access log.
Can
Invite their own consultants, with an expiry; request the emergency keys; confirm the stand-in or object.
second factor required

Trusted stand-in

Sees
Only the systems entrusted to them, and only during a stand-in period assigned to them.
Can
Work with personal, time-limited access. The stand-in is not a member of the software house.

For clients the second factor is optional; once turned on, it is required at every sign-in. Platform administrators are required to use it, as owners are.

4 · Controlled sharing

A key is granted with fingerprint confirmation, and the people concerned are notified.

  • An owner grants it from the system's Share window and confirms on their own computer: with fingerprint confirmation (Touch ID) on a Mac, with an explicit confirmation on other systems.
  • A short, single-use authorization. The platform issues a code valid for 10 minutes, usable once and bound to that one grant: who grants it, who receives it, which system, which collection, read-only. Only its cryptographic fingerprint remains in the database.
  • The vault server performs a second check. The vault-gate, the service that runs alongside the vault, verifies the authorization independently and grants read access only to that system's working collection, provided that the collection appears on the list maintained manually on that server.
  • A notification at every share. It is always sent to the owners, to the person concerned and, when it concerns the client's systems, to the client. Every operation remains in the log, and access can be revoked at any time.
5 · Production keys

On a computer only when needed, with a record and a reminder.

Some systems have only a production environment, and during an incident the keys are needed there. Instead of copying them by hand, without any record, an official procedure with dedicated protections is available.

A separate operation

It never runs together with the restoration of development keys. A window first shows the exact names and the file; the operation is then confirmed by fingerprint. It is reserved for owners and for members whom an owner has authorized for that system: the server verifies this every time.

A protected file

One file per environment, readable only by the computer's user and written only if git excludes it. A different value already present is not replaced without confirmation. The coding assistant does not read it.

A record and a reminder

The system's log records who retrieved the keys, on which computer, and which keys (names only). After 7 days the app reminds the user to remove them; removal takes one click.

When a person leaves the software house, when a computer is revoked or when a permission is withdrawn, the related production keys are marked "to remove" and the app deletes them from that computer at its next start or check, with a confirmation. The platform cannot delete files remotely: if that computer is never switched on again, this remains visible in the list. Furthermore, anyone with access to a collection in the vault can still read a value manually: the real boundary is the vault, that is, who has access to each collection.
6 · The trusted stand-in

Personal, time-limited access, handed back one by one.

  • The software house appoints the stand-in, and the client confirms. The client sees the stand-in's name and can object, giving a reason. Every six months we ask the stand-in whether they are still available.
  • Personal access, not the software house's. The stand-in uses their own account, their own SSH key and users prepared for them, with the minimum role required. In the vault they get the Stand-in collection with the credentials prepared for them, not the software house's passwords. They receive development keys only if an owner grants them, and only during the stand-in period.
  • They see only what is entrusted to them. The assigned systems, only during a stand-in period assigned to them: the rule is enforced by the database. The second factor is required for the stand-in as well.
  • At the end, every access is handed back. Granted keys are withdrawn through the vault-gate, the stand-in's computer is disconnected and production keys are marked for removal; SSH users prepared on the servers expire automatically on the end date. The stand-in period closes only once the revocations are verified (or confirmed, where they cannot be verified); the list of keys to rotate follows.
7 · The client is protected

Emergency keys belong to the client, like a domain.

  • A complete view, on the web. The client consults the full documentation of its systems and the log of who had access to what, and when.
  • Keys on request. While the software house runs the systems, it holds the keys. The client requests them, giving a reason, and the request completes automatically at the end of the agreed period: 30 days, unless the contract states otherwise.
  • Only a reasoned block. The software house can block the release with a reason that the client can read, for at most 30 days at a time and for 3 renewals. A lack of response does not block the release.
  • Released even in the absence of the software house. With the vault we operate, the vault-gate grants the client read access to the Emergency collection. One preliminary step is required: the client's vault account must have been invited and confirmed by the software house, and the app shows a reminder until this is done. With a client's own vault or Bitwarden cloud, the release remains a manual step.
  • No dependence on the vendor. The description is continuity.yaml, a text file kept in the client's repository, readable without Symbiont.
The client's page: emergency keys are released on request after 30 days, unless there is a reasoned block.
8 · The app on the computer

Data kept on the computer remains encrypted.

Signing in

The session is stored encrypted with the operating system's keychain; where no keychain is available, as on Linux without a keyring, the app stores neither the session nor the local copy. The vault's master password never passes through the app.

The offline copy

To allow work without a connection, the app keeps a copy of systems, maps and procedures. Every row is encrypted (AES-256-GCM) with a random key protected by the operating system's keychain. The copy never contains key values or vault contents.

Clean-up and confirmations

The copy is erased at sign-out, when the user is no longer part of the software house, or when another person signs in. Sensitive operations, such as releasing keys, removing a person or revoking a computer, require fingerprint confirmation (Touch ID) on a Mac.

9 · Where the data is

In the European Union, on separate servers.

  • Servers reachable only with a key. SSH access with keys only, a firewall, automatic security updates. The vault runs on a dedicated server, separate from the web app's, so that a problem with one does not affect the other.
  • Encrypted backups. A copy of the database and of the vault is made every day; every night an encrypted copy is moved off the server, in Germany, and every week a second encrypted copy is stored with another provider, in the EU. Whoever stores them cannot read them. The database also has the provider's daily backups, kept for 7 days.
  • Who on our side has access. Only the iostek staff who run the service, for the purpose of running, protecting and supporting it. Administrative actions, such as exports and deletions, are recorded in a log. Nobody on our side can read the vault's contents.
  • A map that requires protection. The description of the systems contains no secrets, but it shows how they are built. For this reason each software house is kept separate from the others in the database, and data is transmitted encrypted.
ServiceProvider and location
Database and sign-inSupabase · EU (Frankfurt)
Web app and vaultHetzner · Germany (Nuremberg) and Finland (Helsinki)
BackupsHetzner · Germany; second copy on Cloudflare R2 · EU
Account emailsResend · sent from the EU (Ireland)
PaymentsStripe · EU (Ireland)

The full list of providers and the security measures are in the privacy policy and the data processing terms.

10 · Limits and responsibilities

What we can guarantee, and what we cannot.

What remains your responsibility

  • The security of your team's computers and accounts: a program running under your user account can reach everything you can reach, including keys stored on disk.
  • Strong master passwords, and the second factor in the vault too.
  • Deciding who has access, revoking it when someone leaves, and rotating keys whenever there is any suspicion.
  • A copy of the essential keys outside the vault as well. Your systems should not read keys from the vault in order to run.

What we do not claim

  • That the guard and the secret filter are infallible: they stop mistakes, not someone who intends to circumvent them.
  • That "verified" is an independent check: checks run on the software house's computers.
  • That we can recover a lost master password: we cannot.
  • That we hold security certifications or external reviews: at present we hold none.

If the platform were breached

  • An attacker would find none of your systems' passwords or keys, because the platform does not store them.
  • It could grant read-only access, only to collections listed by hand on the vault server, to an account the software house has already confirmed in the vault. The vault-gate cannot establish whether an owner actually confirmed with a fingerprint: that is why the limits live on the vault server, and every grant stays in its log.
  • It could revoke access: the result would be an outage, not a data leak.
  • It could not write to the vault, confirm an account or add itself as a user.

If the software house uses Bitwarden cloud or its own vault, the security and backups of that vault remain its responsibility, and automatic releases and revocations do not apply: they remain manual steps.

11 · Reporting

Reporting a security problem.

Security problems should be reported to security@getsymbiont.com, with a description of what was found and how to reproduce it. Please do not use other people's data and do not make the problem public before it has been fixed. If a breach concerns the personal data that your software house processes with Symbiont, we will inform you without undue delay, within 48 hours of becoming aware of it.